The
2014 Electoral Act has confirmed that there will be an “Open List”
proportional system that will be used to count the votes and
determine the selection of members of Parliament.
There
will be one national
constituency electing
50 parliamentarians, or roughly 2% of votes (about 10,800 votes) per
parliamentarian.
But
the stipulation of a 5% threshold for parties and Independents
(roughly 27,000 votes), makes a mockery of the claims of
proportionality and “one person-one vote- equal value”.
Small
parties and Independents unable to get a minimum of around 27,000
votes cast will be disqualified from being elected to Parliament.
Moreover, the votes received by them will have no further influence,
and hence totally wasted.
If,
by some miracle, Independents do get elected, they will be wasting
at least two thirds of
their supporters’ votes.
In
contrast, many of the individuals elected under their Party
umbrellas, will almost certainly have much smaller numbers of votes,
compared to those being disqualified by the 5% threshold.
The
counting method
Sections
104 to 106 of the Electoral Decree 2014, sets out the methods for
the counting of votes and calculation of each party’s allocation in
Parliament.
Unfortunately,
the method outlined in the Decree, while legally appropriate, is
difficult to understand and explain to the general public or even
political parties (readers can have a go if they want).
Nevertheless,
the simple arithmetical example I give below conveys how the numbers
of parliamentarians for each party will be determined.
The
voting basics
I
estimate from demographic projections that there are about 580
thousand eligible voters in 2014.
Some
540,000 voters appear to have been registered. Let us suppose that
they all vote.
Then
the election basic numbers are as in Table A.
|
Table
A: Election Basics
|
|
No
of seats in Parliament
|
50
|
|
Total
voters
|
540,000
|
|
Votes
per seat
|
10,800
|
|
5%
threshold to be elected
|
27,000
|
|
Table
B Votes Received
|
|
|
Votes
|
|
Party
A
|
169,000
|
|
Party
B
|
185,000
|
|
Party
C
|
45,000
|
|
Party
D
|
55,000
|
|
Party
E
|
25,000
|
|
Independent
1
|
30,000
|
|
Independent
2
|
20,000
|
|
Independent
3
|
11,000
|
|
Total
|
540000
|
|
Table
C Allocating the 49 Parliamentarians
|
|
(1)
Party
|
(2)
Votes
|
(3)
Proportion
of
454,000
|
(4)
Fractional
Number
Of
seats
|
(5)
Rounded
Numbers
Of
seats
|
|
Party
A
|
169000
|
0.372
|
18.24
|
18
|
|
Party
B
|
185000
|
0.407
|
19.97
|
20
|
|
Party
C
|
45000
|
0.099
|
4.86
|
5
|
|
Party
D
|
55000
|
0.121
|
5.94
|
6
|
|
Total
for above
|
454000
|
1
|
49
|
49
|
|
Independent
1
|
|
|
|
1
|
|
Total
in Parliament
|
|
|
50
|
|
Table
D Voters per seat won
|
|
|
(1)
Votes
|
(2)
Seats
|
(3)
Votes/seat
|
|
Party
A
|
169000
|
18
|
9,389
|
|
Party
B
|
185000
|
20
|
9,250
|
|
Party
C
|
45000
|
5
|
9,000
|
|
Party
D
|
55000
|
6
|
9,167
|
|
Party
E
|
25000
|
0
|
|
|
Indep
1
|
30000
|
1
|
30,000
|
|
Indep
2
|
20000
|
0
|
|
|
Indep
3
|
11000
|
0
|
|
|
|
540000
|
50
|
10,800
|
|
Table
E: Selecting the Parliamentarians for Party A
|
|
Candidate
|
Votes
|
Elected?
|
|
1.
The Leader
|
118,400
|
YES
|
|
2
|
15,000
|
YES
|
|
3
|
10,000
|
YES
|
|
4
|
3000
|
YES
|
|
5
|
2800
|
YES
|
|
6
|
2600
|
YES
|
|
7
|
2400
|
YES
|
|
8
|
2200
|
YES
|
|
9
|
2000
|
YES
|
|
10
|
1800
|
YES
|
|
11
|
1600
|
YES
|
|
12
|
1400
|
YES
|
|
13
|
1200
|
YES
|
|
14
|
1000
|
YES
|
|
15
|
800
|
YES
|
|
16
|
600
|
YES
|
|
17
|
400
|
YES
|
|
18
|
200
|
YES
|
|
32
others totalling
|
1600
|
NO
|
|
Total
votes received
|
169,000
|
|
In
a 50 seat parliament, each parliamentarian on
average will
represent 10,800 voters.
This
5% threshold of 540,000 votes) works out to a massive 27,000 votes or
almost three times the average received by parliamentarians in
general.
Hypothetical
results in the 2014 Elections
Let
us suppose that the five political parties (FFP, SODELPA, FLP, NFP,
PDP) and 3 Independents receive the following votes (you can allocate
whatever actual Party name you wish to A, B,C, D and E).
But
according to the Decree Section 104 (3)
“The
Electoral Commission must then disregard any total number of votes
received under the name of any political party or any independent
candidate that has not received a total that is at least 5% of the
total number of votes received by all the political parties and
independent candidates.”
I
have shaded in yellow those who do not make the 5% threshold of
27,000 votes.
i.e.
Party E and the Independents 2 and 3 are OUT and will not be in
Parliament.
So
all their votes are wasted.
Independent
1 is elected with certainty (but with 30,000 votes).
The
votes of Party E and all the Independents are excluded, in
calculating the numbers of candidates from the political parties A,
B, C and D, eligible to go into Parliament.
Hence
49 parliamentary seats
have to be allocated to Parties A, B, C and D.
and strictly in proportion to the votes they have received.
Table
C gives in
Column
(3) the exact proportions of the total votes received by Parties A,
B, C and D
Column
(4) gives the exact number of parliamentarians they are entitled to
(including the fractions)
Column
(5) gives the numbers rounded up, so as to add up to 49 exactly.
[The
more accurate method is to keep giving whole numbers to the parties
with the
largest fractions
until you get 49: i.e you would start with Party B which was
entitled to 19.97, round it up to 20, then Party D (round 5.94 up to
with 6) then Party C (round 4.86 up to 5). By that time you will
already have 49, and so Party A does not an extra parliamentarian for
the fraction 0.24]
When
you add the 1 Independent, you get a total of 50 required for the
parliament.
Lesson
1: Parties need to be prepared for a “hung” parliament
In
the particular arithmetic example I have given above (Table C), the
outcome is a “hung parliament” with no Party receiving a majority
of 26 out of 50.
With
the five parties (FFP, SODELPA, FLP, NFP, PDP) contesting, this may
well be the likely outcome.
For
fun, readers can try various coalitions post-election, which would
give a minimum of 26. Even the one Independent or the small parties
might become “king-makers”: eg B, C and the Independent.
But
there are many other lessons that parties, candidates and voters need
to consider.
How
are individual parliamentarians chosen?
Because
this is an “Open List” system, whatever the original List
provided by the contesting parties, their
candidates will be ranked by the numbers of votes they receive.
(not the party ranking)
Thus,
if Party A is entitled to 18 seats in Parliament, then the first 18
in order of votes received will be selected.
The
remain 32 candidates will not be selected (assuming that each party
puts up 50 candidates).
This
Open List system has the undeniable advantage that really unpopular
candidates are not going to get into parliament just because they
have joined a popular party. But they could still get in, if their
other colleagues are equally unpopular.
If
voters decide to vote only for “The Leader”, then some of the
minor candidates may not get enough votes to make it to the top of
the List (see Table E below).
Parties
will have to agree with their candidate where
they should campaign in order to win not just maximum votes for their
party, but also for themselves as individuals.
Many
candidates will want to campaign only in the populous areas where
there are large numbers of voters, or where they feel they have the
best chance.
Few
will want to campaign in widespread areas where the numbers of voters
are small, and the costs of campaigning will be high.
Lesson
2: Not
only will each Party be competing against other parties, but
candidates within
each party
will also be competing against
each other.
Lesson
3: Some
candidates will have to “sacrifice” their own chances of being
elected, in order to campaign in remote less densely populated areas,
in order to win maximum votes for their parties, even if they
themselves do not win.
The
impact of the 5% threshold
Table
E shows very clearly, why the system is stacked against small parties
and Independents (shown in green), because of the 5% threshold
clauses in the Decree.
In
the whole parliament, each of the 50 parliamentarians represent some
10,800 voters (last row and last column).
But
Parties A, B, C and D roughly get 1 seat for every 9,200 votes they
receive (last column).
In
contrast, Party E with 25,000 votes does
not get a single seat
although in a strict proportional system they would have been
entitled to at least 2 seats.
Neither
do Independent 2 (with 20,000 votes) or Independent 3 (with 11,000
votes) get elected, even though they have got more than the averages
for the other parties.
Independent
1, who gets elected with 30,000 votes, had more than three times the
average for those elected from the parties.
In
the example above, all the votes for Party E and Independents 2 and 3
are totally wasted.
Even
Independent 1 who gets elected (but with 30,000 votes) is wasting the
votes of some 20,000 or two thirds of his/her supporters.
Had
these 30,000 votes gone to any party, they would have elected 3
parliamentarians.
Effectively,
their loss will be gained by the larger parties.
If
the ultimate objective of candidates is to get into parliament and
affect government policy, either as part of government or as
Opposition, then Independents and small parties would be strongly
advised to negotiate with the larger parties to obtain agreement on
common manifestoes, and join them rather than going on their own.
An
Independent joining a large party with the support of 30,000 voters,
would take 2 other parliamentarians with him or her, to vote for
his/her manifesto.
Lesson
4: This
system is biased against small parties and Independents: they should
consider joining like-minded large parties with similar manifesto
objectives.
Lesson
5: Voters
must understand that at least two thirds of their votes for
Independents will be wasted, even if their candidate is successful.
All
their votes will be wasted if the Independent does not get the
minimum of 27,000. Votes.
Lesson
6: Votes
for large parties will not be wasted, even
if the candidate voted for does not get elected.
Even these votes are amalgamated for the Party and counted towards
the Party share.
How
many votes will “successful” party parliamentarians get?
Suppose
that Party A is led by a nationally popular Leader and the total
votes received (169,000) entitles Party A to receive 18 seats in
Parliament (as in my example above).
All
the candidates of Party A will be ranked in order, by the number of
votes received, going down from The Great Leader down to Candidate 50
(as in Table E).
In
the example here, out of the 169,000 votes going to Party A, The
Leader has received 118,400 votes, Candidate 2 has received 15,000,
Candidate 3 has received 10,000 votes.
The
other 15 who get elected to Parliament received less than 3,000 votes
each, going to the 18th
parliamentarian, who has got only 200 votes but is elected.
These
fifteen (plus the first three) are all elected under the Party’s
quota of 18 seats in Parliament, largely because of the large number
of votes garnered by the Leader. (Note: this weakness would apply
equally to a “Closed List” system).
But
the fact remains that the Electoral Decree, disqualifies Independents
and candidates for all small Parties who receive less than the 5%
threshold (less than around 27,000) even if they receive far more
than those elected under the umbrella of Party votes.
In
the example below, 17 out of the first 18 would not
have been elected as
Independents.
Lesson
7: Under this Electoral Decree, the claim of “one person-one
vote-equal value” has little value for those who vote for
Independents and small parties which end up not receiving the minimum
threshold of 5% of votes cast (roughly 27,000 votes).
Women
are unlikely to be represented fairly
Under
the Closed List system (which most Parties had advocated to the Ghai
Commission), women could have had a reasonable chance of being placed
at the top of the different Party Lists and hence automatically
elected, as part of their party quota.
But
with the Open List system, women are back to the same situation they
had with previous elections.
Given
the harsh campaigning requirements, and the unwillingness of voters
(both men and women) to vote for women candidates, good women
candidates are unlikely to stand, and if they do, unlikely to be
elected in reasonable numbers.
The
one saving grace with the one national constituency is that good
women candidates (as with good men candidates) will be able to appeal
to all voters in Fiji and accumulate reasonable numbers of votes.
Lesson
8: Women candidates, in addition to espousing their good party
policies, need to appeal especially to women voters (who comprise 50%
of all voters), to vote for good women candidates, whose policies
they agree with.
